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ABSTRACT	
The	Independent	Lawyers’	Association	of	Myanmar	(ILAM)	is	an	
attempt	 to	 create	 an	 independent	 national	bar	 association	within	
Myanmar.	ILAM	is	a	product	of	efforts	by	international	entities	such	
as	 the	 International	 Bar	 Association	 (IBA)	 and	 domestic	 lawyers	
throughout	Myanmar	 to	 form	 a	 nation-wide	 bar	 association	 that	
follows	international	ideas	regarding	a	legal	profession	independent	
of	 state	 control.	 The	 introduction	 of	 such	 ideas	 deviates	 from	
Myanmar’s	history,	which	placed	 lawyers	under	 the	 control	of	 the	
state	and	made	the	legal	system	an	instrument	of	authoritarian	rule.	
The	growth	of	ILAM	is	a	testament	to	legal	reform	currently	taking	
place	 in	 Myanmar,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 a	 mirror	 to	 the	 challenges	 of	
transplanting	 international	 notions	 of	 an	independent	 legal	
profession	into	a	formerly	closed	developing	country	emerging	into	
a	 larger	global	 community.	The	 experiences	of	 ILAM	offer	 insights	
regarding	 theories	 of	 legal	 transplants,	 particularly	 for	 Gunther	
Tuebner’s	notion	of	a	legal	irritant.	The	analysis	uses	ILAM	as	a	case	
study	 to	 draw	 out	 implications	 regarding	 the	 nuances	 of	 legal	
transplant	theory	and	generate	lessons	for	similar	efforts	elsewhere	
to	promote	international	ideas	in	local	contexts.	
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I.	INTRODUCTION	The	Independent	Lawyers’	Association	of	Myanmar	(“ILAM”)	is	 a	product	of	 the	 International	Bar	Association	 (“IBA”)	Human	Rights	Initiative	(“IBAHRI”)	conducted	in	2014-2016	in	Myanmar,	the	 country	 formerly	 known	 as	 Burma.	 ILAM	 represents	 an	attempt	to	create	an	independent	national	bar	association	in	terms	of	 being	 a	 nation-wide	 organization	 for	 the	 Myanmar	 legal	profession	 operating	 outside	 the	 control	 of	 the	Myanmar	 state.1	Throughout	 its	 history	 under	 British	 colonial	 rule	 and	 post-colonial	 independence,	 Myanmar	 did	 not	 host	 an	 independent	national	bar	association.	As	a	result,	in	advancing	the	development	of	ILAM,	the	IBAHRI	effectively	sought	to	introduce	some	form	of	an	 independent	 national	 bar	 association	 into	 Myanmar.	 As	 an	initiative	of	the	IBA,	the	IBAHRI	held	to	IBA	perspectives	regarding	the	legal	profession	and	so	exemplified	an	attempted	transmission	of	 international	 expectations	 for	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association	into	a	domestic	context.	The	discussion	 in	the	 following	sections	treats	 the	IBAHRI’s	efforts	 for	 ILAM	as	a	case	study	 involving	a	 legal	 transplant	of	a	legal	 institution.	The	discussion	analyzes	the	events	surrounding	the	 creation	 of	 ILAM,	 not	 just	 as	 a	 testament	 to	 legal	 reform	currently	taking	place	in	Myanmar,	but	also	as	a	mirror	reflecting	the	 challenges	 facing	 aspirations	 of	 transplanting	 international	notions	 of	 legal	 institutions	 into	 a	 formerly	 closed	 developing	
                                                             1.	 Myanmar,	 Capacity-Building	 2014-2016,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (Apr.	 15,	 2015),	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=B0DFF549-F0F3-4A90-83D5-40B902FEDBF9	[https://perma.cc/EBV9-QNBT]	[hereinafter	IBA	2015b].	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1135	country	emerging	into	a	larger	global	community.	In	doing	so,	the	analysis	 places	 ILAM	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 theoretical	discourse	 regarding	 legal	 transplants	 between	Alan	Watson	 and	Pierre	 Legrand,	 and	 asserts	 ILAM	 as	 a	 permutation	 of	 Gunther	Tuebner’s	notion	of	a	legal	irritant.	The	analysis	seeks	to	use	the	case	of	ILAM	to	draw	out	implications	regarding	nuances	of	legal	transplant	 theory	 with	 a	 goal	 of	 improving	 its	 applicability	 for	similar	cases	elsewhere.	The	discussion	begins	with	a	review	of	legal	transplant	theory	demarcating	 the	 major	 points	 of	 debate	 and	 the	 position	 of	Teubner’s	notion	of	legal	irritants.	The	discussion	then	turns	to	a	summary	offering	background	regarding	the	IBAHRI’s	work	in	the	formation	of	ILAM.	This	is	subsequently	followed	by	commentary	about	the	issues	that	arose	in	the	course	of	the	IBAHRI’s	activities,	with	attendant	analysis	of	the	significance	of	such	issues	for	legal	transplant	 theory.	 A	 conclusion	 finishes	 the	 analysis	 with	 a	summary	 of	 the	 implications	 ILAM’s	 experiences	 pose	 for	 legal	transplant	 theory,	 a	 statement	 regarding	 applicability	 for	 other	situations	 similar	 to	Myanmar	 involving	 the	 promotion	 of	 ideas	from	 an	 international	 level	 to	 local	 contexts,	 and	 a	 proposal	 for	future	directions	of	research.	Methodologically,	the	analysis	in	the	following	sections	is	part	of	 an	 ongoing	 research	project	 on	 the	 experiences	 of	 ILAM.	The	discussion	 utilizes	 field	 research	 conducted	 during	 2014-2017	involving	 observations	 of	 ILAM	 events,	 interviews	 with	participants	 in	 IBAHRI	 events	 regarding	 ILAM,	 and	 documents	made	available	by	the	IBA,	ILAM,	Myanmar	government	ministries,	and	civil	society	organizations	(“CSOs”).	Due	to	 the	sensitivity	of	the	 ongoing	 process	 of	 legal	 reforms	 in	 Myanmar—including	reforms	for	an	independent	national	bar	association—precautions	are	taken	to	protect	the	institutions	and	individuals	used	for	this	study.	Such	precautions	pose	a	challenge	since	the	limited	number	of	participants	involved	in	the	formation	of	ILAM	increases	the	risk	of	inference	regarding	identities.	As	a	result,	the	analysis	makes	an	effort	 to	 avoid	 information	 that	 could	 be	 used	 to	 determine	 the	identities	of	participants	 associated	with	 the	 formation	of	 ILAM,	including	 affiliations	 with	 government	 offices,	 non-government	organizations,	private	entities,	or	any	 individual	representatives.	In	 addition,	 direct	 quotes	 are	 avoided	 to	 prevent	 possible	inferences	about	the	identity	of	the	speakers.	When	possible,	the	
1136	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	analysis	 avoids	 interview	 data	 and	 makes	 use	 of	 documents	acquired	through	news	media,	internet	sources,	or	in-person	visits	to	relevant	government	and	civil	society	offices.	The	nature	of	the	risk	is	exemplified	by	the	loss	of	U	Ko	Ni,	a	lawyer	who	served	as	a	prominent	 figure	 in	 the	 effort	 to	 create	 ILAM.2	 U	 Ko	 Ni	 was	assassinated	in	January	2017,3	and	his	loss	inflicted	a	blow	to	both	the	advancement	of	 ILAM	and	 the	movement	 for	 legal	 reform	 in	Myanmar.	His	death	highlights	the	continuing	dangers	that	persist	for	Myanmar	lawyers,	the	magnitude	of	the	sensitivity	tied	to	legal	reform	in	Myanmar,	and	the	significance	of	the	issues	related	to	the	rule	of	law	in	Myanmar.	
II.	THEORY	The	discourse	on	legal	transplants	predates	the	framework	of	Alan	Watson	and	Pierre	LeGrand	raised	by	Andrew	Harding.4	In	his	review	of	 the	concept	of	 legal	 transplants,5	 John	Cairns	 finds	the	first	scholarly	application	of	the	term	“transplants”	in	relation	to	law	 occurring	 in	 a	 1927	 speech	 by	 Frederick	 P.	 Walton	 to	 the	International	Academy	of	Comparative	Law	that	addressed	cases	where	countries	discarded	 their	own	 legal	heritage	and	adopted	foreign	 legal	 systems.6	 The	 term	 persisted,	 with	 Cairns	 finding	examples	from	the	1930s	in	the	works	of	R.W.	Lee	on	the	spread	of	Roman-Dutch	 law	 to	 European	 colonies,	 Hermann	 Mannheim’s	study	on	 the	European	adoption	of	 juries	 in	 criminal	 trials	 from	England,	and	Henri	Levy	Ullmann’s	observation	of	Turkey’s	legal	
                                                             2.	 	IBAHRI	Decries	Fatal	Shooting	of	Prominent	Lawyer	U	Ko	Ni	in	Myanmar	and	Calls	
for	 an	 Investigation,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (Jan.	 31,	 2017),	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=115d3918-3b50-4fef-b7ba-3fa75dc680ab	[https://perma.cc/U2LX-H5TG].	3.	 Ei	Ei	Toe	Lwin	&	Shoon	Naing,	“The	Death	of	the	Rule	of	Law”:	Coming	to	Terms	
With	 the	 Loss	 of	 U	 Ko	 Ni,	 MYANMAR	 TIMES	 (Feb.	 2,	 2017),	https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/24784-the-death-of-the-rule-of-law-coming-to-terms-with-the-loss-of-u-ko-ni.html	 [https://perma.cc/U8N5-DLCH];	Wai	Moe,	U	Ko	Ni,	A	Prominent	Muslim	Lawyer	in	Myanmar,	is	Fatally	Shot,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Jan.	29,	2017),	https://nyti.ms/2jGmFSU	[https://perma.cc/8VPP-7ZWP].	4.	 See	generally	ANDREW	HARDING,	LEGAL	TRANSPLANTS	IN	EAST	ASIA	AND	OCEANIA	(2018)	[hereinafter	Harding	2018].	5.	 See	generally	John	Cairns,	Watson,	Walton,	and	the	History	of	Legal	Transplants,	41	G.A.	J.	INT’L	&	COMP.	L.	687	(2013)	[hereinafter	Cairns	2013].	6.	 Frederick	Walton,	The	Historical	School	of	 Jurisprudence	and	Transplantations	of	
Law,	9	J.	COMP.	LEGIS.	&	INT’L	L.	183	(1927).	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1137	development.7	The	metaphor	of	transplantation	continued	into	the	1950s,	with	examples	 in	B.A.	Watley’s	 report	on	 the	1950	Rome	UNIDROIT	 conference8	 and	 C.J.	 Hamson’s	 summary	 of	 the	International	 1955	 Istanbul	 meeting	 for	 the	 Committee	 on	Comparative	Law.9	Even	at	the	time	of	Alan	Watson’s	seminal	book	on	 Legal	 Transplants,10	 the	 idea	 of	 legal	 transplants	 appeared	contemporaneously	 in	 Otto	 Kahn-Freund’s	 Chorley	 Lecture	 of	1973,11	 John	 Beckstrom’s	 work	 on	 the	 transplantation	 of	 legal	systems	from	1973,12	and	Jean	Rivero’s	metaphor	of	medical	organ	transplants	to	describe	local	imitation	of	foreign	legal	models	from	1980.13	Hence,	 the	 term	 legal	 transplants	 and	 the	corresponding	discourse	 over	 its	 meaning	 precede	 the	 more	 current	 tensions	between	Watson	and	Legrand.	In	 conceptualizing	 legal	 transplants,	 there	 is	 a	 range	 of	approaches	 that	 help	 to	 clarify	 its	 implications.	With	 respect	 to	Watson	and	LeGrand,	Watson	sees	legal	concepts	as	autonomous	from	context	and	so	readily	transferable	across	different	locations,	while	LeGrand	sees	legal	concepts	as	unique	to	each	context	and	hence	 wholly	 non-transferable	 from	 one	 place	 to	 another.14	 In	contrast,	 Anna	 Dolidze	 describes	 legal	 transplants	 as	 being	horizontal	 in	terms	of	a	transnational	diffusion	of	 ideas	between	states,	or	vertical	in	terms	of	ideas	that	are	either	diffused	up	from	domestic	 law	 to	 international	 law	 or	 diffused	 down	 from	international	law	to	domestic	law.15	An	additional	example	is	John	Gillespie,	 who	 views	 legal	 transplants	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	discourse	analysis	to	identify	the	nature	of	power	structures	and	individual	 agency	 in	 communications	 and	 interactions	 in	
                                                             7.	 Cairns	2013,	supra	note	5,	at	694.	8.	 See	generally	B.A.	Wortley,	Report	on	the	Rome	Conference	1950,	32	J.	COMP.	LEGIS.	&	INT’L		L.,	91	(1950).	9.	 C.J.	Hamson,	The	Istanbul	Conference	of	1955,	5	INT’L	&	COMP.	L.	Q.	26,	27	(1956).	10.	 See	 generally	ALAN	WATSON,	 LEGAL	 TRANSPLANTS:	 AN	 APPROACH	 TO	 COMPARATIVE	LAW	(1993)	[hereinafter	Watson	1993].	11.	 Id.	12.	 See	generally	John	Beckstrom,	Transplantation	of	Legal	Systems,	21	AM.	J.	COM.	L.	557	(1973).	13.	 Jean	 Rivero,	 Les	 Phenomnenes	 D’imitation	 des	 Modeles	 Etrangers	 en	 Droit	
Administrative,	2	PAGES	DE	DOCTRINE	459	(1980).	14.	 Harding	2018,	supra	note	4;	see	also	Pierre	Legrand,	The	Impossibility	of	Legal	
Transplants,	MAASTRICHT	J.	COMP.	L.	4(2),	111-24	(1997);	Watson	1993,	supra	note	10.	15.	 Anna	Dolidze,	Bridging	 Comparative	 and	 International	 Law:	Amicus	 Curiae	
Participation	as	a	Vertical	Legal	Transplant,	26	EUROPEAN	J.	INT’L	L.	4,	851-80	(2016).	
1138	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	lawmaking.16	Jonathan	Miller	sees	legal	transplants	as	falling	into	one	of	several	categories	in	a	typology:	cost-saving,	where	a	drafter	of	a	law	tries	to	save	time	and	costs	in	experimentation	by	using	a	solution	 employed	 elsewhere;	 externally-dictated,	 where	dominant	 foreign	 actors	 hold	 sufficient	 power	 to	 dictate	 the	adoption	 of	 foreign	 legal	 models	 in	 a	 country;	 entrepreneurial,	where	 domestic	 actors	 encourage	 the	 adoption	 of	 foreign	 legal	ideas	 in	 their	 own	 country;	 or	 legitimacy-generating,	 where	domestic	 actors	 seek	 to	 use	 prestigious	 foreign	 legal	 ideas	 to	bolster	 their	domestic	 legitimacy.17	 John	Wise	eschews	 the	 term	“transplant”	because	of	its	tendency	to	use	a	dichotomy	of	internal	versus	 external,	 and	 favors	 instead	 terms	 like	 “borrowing,”	“circulation,”	and	“diffusion”	that	reflect	what	he	considers	to	be	a	more	 accurate	 notion	 of	 general	movements	 of	 ideas	 in	 cultural	networks	 operating	 independently	 of	 national	 borders.18	 John	Gillespie,	Sally	Low,	and	Penelope	Nicholson	posit	that	the	success	or	 failure	 of	 legal	 transfers	 is	 a	 function	 of	 social	 demand	 in	recipient	 countries,	 and	 so	 highlights	 the	 need	 by	 development	actors	to	listen	to	local	experiences.19	While	 the	perspectives	on	 legal	 transplants	are	diverse,	 the	positions	of	Watson	and	Legrand	present	an	interesting	dynamic	in	that	they	form	a	theoretical	framework	of	opposing	views	about	the	existential	nature	of	legal	transplants,	with	Watson’s	position	accommodating	 the	 idea	 of	 legal	 transplants	 and	 Legrand’s	position	rendering	it	impractical	or	at	most	inappropriate.	Watson	and	Legrand,	in	effect,	represent	the	logical	extremes	of	Otto	Kahn-Freund’s	 conceptualization	 of	 a	 spectrum	 encompassing	 legal	institutions	 that	 are	mechanical	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 insulated	from	culture	versus	legal	institutions	that	are	organic	in	the	sense	
                                                             16.	 See	generally	John	Gillespie,	Towards	a	Discursive	Analysis	of	Legal	Transfers	
into	Developing	East	Asia,	40	INT’L	L.	&	POL.	683	(2008).	17.	 Jonathan	 Miller,	 A	 Typology	 of	 Legal	 Transplants:	 Using	 Sociology,	 Legal	
History,	and	Argentine	Examples	to	Explain	the	Transplant	Process,	51	AM.	J.	COMP.	L.	839-86	(2003).	18.	 Edward	Wise,	The	Transplant	of	Legal	Patterns,	38	AM.	J.	COMP.	L.	Supplement:	1,	1-22	(1990).	19.	 Pip	Nicholson	&	Sally	Low,	Local	Accounts	of	Rule	of	Law	Aid:	Implications	for	
Donors,	 5	 HAGUE	 J.	 RULE	 L.	 1,	 1-43	 (2013);	 Penelope	 Nicholson	 &	 John	 Gillespie,	
Interpreting	Legal	Transfers:	The	 Implications	 for	Law	and	Development,	 in	LAW	AND	DEVELOPMENT	AND	THE	GLOBAL	DISCOURSES	OF	LEGAL	TRANSFERS	(2012).		
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1139	of	being	culturally	embedded.20	Otto	Kahn-Freund	postulated	that	more	mechanical	 legal	 institutions	are	relatively	easy	to	transfer	between	cultures,	while	organic	ones	are	more	difficult	to	transfer	to	 alien	 cultures.	 More	 recent	 scholarship	 has	 sought	 a	 way	between	Watson	and	Legrand,	with	scholars	 like	Melissa	Crouch	and	David	Nelken	finding	that	the	concept	of	legal	transplants	can	be	useful	in	understanding	the	transnational	spread	of	legal	ideas	so	long	as	it	is	qualified	by	some	consideration	of	their	association	with	context.21	Gunther	 Teubner	 represents	 an	 additional	 alternative	between	 Watson	 and	 Legrand,	 which	 differs	 from	 Crouch	 and	Nelken	in	exercising	a	dialectical	approach	that	interprets	a	legal	transplant	as	affecting	change	within	a	new	context	but	also	being	subject	 to	 change	 by	 the	 forces	 within	 it.22	 Teubner,	 looking	beyond	the	Watson-Legrand	dichotomy	of	integration	or	repulsion	of	legal	ideas	across	cultures,	adopts	the	idea	of	legal	irritants	that	cause	unexpected	consequences	via	an	“evolutionary	dynamic	 in	which	 the	external	 rule’s	meaning	will	be	 reconstructed	and	 the	internal	 context	 will	 undergo	 fundamental	 change.”23	 Teubner	conceives	of	 legal	 irritants	 as	operating	 in	 two	ways:	 (1)	 a	 legal	transformation,	 where	 a	 legal	 idea	 is	 recontextualized	 by	 new	conditions	 but	 may	 still	 be	 recognizable	 even	 though	 its	 legal	interpretation	 changes	 from	 the	 original;	 and	 (2)	 a	 social	transformation,	where	 the	 recognition	 of	 a	 legal	 idea	will	 cause	changes	in	a	social	system	even	as	the	idea	is	reconstructed	by	the	system.	Teubner	goes	 further	 to	assert	 that	 these	 two	processes	are	 inter-related	 in	 that	 they	 form	 a	 “circular	 co-evolutionary	dynamic”	 of	 “mutual	 irritations”	 upon	 each	 other	 that	 will	fundamentally	alter	the	identity	of	the	legal	idea.24	
                                                             20.	 Cairns	2013,	supra	note	5,	at	643-45;	Otto	Kahn-Freund,	On	Uses	and	Misuses	of	
Comparative	Law,	37	MOD.	L.	REV.	1,	13	(1974);	Gunther	Teubner,	Legal	Irritants:	Good	
Faith	in	British	Law	or	How	Unifying	Law	Ends	up	in	New	Divergences,	61	MOD.	L.	REV.	1,	11-32	(1998)	[hereinafter	Teubner	1998].	21.	 Melissa	 Crouch,	Asian	 Legal	 Transplants	 and	 Rule	 of	 Law	 Reform:	 National	
Human	 Rights	 Commission	 in	 Myanmar	 and	 Indonesia,	 5	 HAGUE	 J.	 RULE	 L.	 146-77	(2013);	David	Nelken,	Legal	Transplants	and	Beyond:	of	Disciplines	and	Metaphors,	in	COMPARATIVE	LAW	IN	THE	21ST	CENTURY	(2002).	22.	 Teubner	1998,	supra	note	20.	23.	 Id.	at	12.	24.	 Id.	at	28.	
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III.	BACKGROUND	In	 relating	 legal	 transplant	 theory	 to	 the	 case	of	 ILAM,	 it	 is	useful	to	review	the	IBAHRI	program	in	Myanmar	that	led	to	the	formation	 of	 ILAM.	 Fact-finding	 reports	 from	 the	 IBA	 and	International	 Commission	 of	 Jurists	 (“ICJ”),	 subsequently	corroborated	by	scholarly	reviews	and	independent	studies,	found	that	 the	 legal	 profession	 in	 Myanmar	 suffers	 from	 a	 history	 of	constraints	 upon	 its	 independence.25	 In	 Myanmar,	 the	 legal	profession	is	divided	into	pleaders,	who	are	licensed	to	practice	in	civil	 and	 criminal	 matters	 in	 district	 and	 township	 courts,	 and	advocates,	who	are	licensed	to	practice	in	all	courts	including	the	Supreme	 Court.26	 During	 the	 British	 colonial	 era,	 pleaders	were	subject	to	the	Legal	Practitioners	Act	of	1879,	which	gave	authority	for	regulation,	licensing,	and	discipline	to	the	High	Court	of	British	Burma,27	 and	 advocates	 were	 subject	 to	 the	 Bar	 Council	 Act	 of	1929,	which	placed	authority	over	rules,	licenses,	and	discipline	in	the	High	Court	but	made	the	High	Court	subject	to	the	authority	of	the	 Bar	 Council.28	 The	 Bar	 Council	 was	 originally	 composed	 of	fifteen	members	chaired	by	 the	Attorney	General	and	 filled	with	four	nominees	 from	the	High	Court	and	ten	members	elected	by	
                                                             25.	 See	generally	Melissa	Crouch,	The	Layers	of	 Legal	Development	 in	Myanmar,	 in	LAW,	SOCIETY	AND	TRANSITION	IN	MYANMAR	(2014);	The	Rule	of	Law	in	Myanmar:	Challenges	
and	 Prospects,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (2012),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=DE0EE11D-9878-4685-A20F-9A0AAF6C3F3E	[https://perma.cc/GM2D-GLU7]	[hereinafter	IBA	2012a];	Right	to	
Counsel:	 Independence	 of	 Lawyers	 in	 Myanmar,	 INT’L	 COMM’N	 OF	 JURISTS,	 (2013),		https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MYANMAR-Right-to-Counsel-electronic.pdf	[https://perma.cc/6C9C-6HVE]		[hereinafter	ICJ	2013];	Nang	Yin	Kham,	An	
Introduction	 to	 the	 Law	 and	 Judicial	 System	 of	 Myanmar,	 INT’L	 MARITIME	 ORG.	 (2014),	available	 at	 https://law.nus.edu.sg/cals/pdfs/wps/CALS-WPS-1402.pdf	[https://perma.cc/F39R-CHPY]	[hereinafter	Kham	2014].	26.	 Bar	Council	Act	of	1929	(Union	of	the	Republic	of	Myanmar	1929),	available	at:	 https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Myanmar-Bar-Council-Act-and-amendments-legislation-1926-eng.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/297F-6HL6]	[hereinafter	Bar	Council	Act	1929];	Courts	Manual	 of	 1999	 (Myanmar	Supreme	Court	1999),	 available	 at:	 http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Courts_Manual-ocr-en.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/B36G-CWBX]	 [hereinafter	 Courts	 Manual	 1999];	 Legal	
Practioners	 Act	 of	 1879	 (Myanmar	 Constitutional	 Tribunal	 1879),	 available	 at:	https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Myanmar-Legal-Practitioners-Act-legislation-1879-eng.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/74LZ-VJPS	 ]	 [hereinafter	Legal	Practitioners	Act	1879].	27.	 Legal	Practitioners	Act	1879,	supra	note	26,	at	sec.	6.	28.	 Bar	Council	Act	1929,	supra	note	26,	at	sec.	15;	Courts	Manual	1999,	supra	note	26,	at	part	1,	sec.	1-2.	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1141	practicing	 advocates.29	 This	 arrangement	 continued	 into	 post-independence	through	much	of	the	military	era	until	1989,	when	the	Bar	Council	was	amended	to	have	eleven	members	comprised	of	the	Attorney	General	as	Chair,	Deputy	Attorney	General	as	Vice-Chair,	 the	 Director-General	 of	 the	 Attorney	 General’s	 Office	 as	Secretary,	a	Supreme	Court	Judge	nominated	by	the	Chief	Justice,	the	 Director-General	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 and	 six	 advocates	chosen	by	the	Supreme	Court.30	Myanmar’s	judicial	system	places	the	High	Court	at	the	administrative	state	or	region	level	and	the	Supreme	 Court	 at	 the	 national	 level,31	 so	 the	 Bar	 Council	 Act	Amendment	of	1989	served	to	centralize	control	over	the	country’s	lawyers	 within	 national	 state	 authority.	 There	 were	 local	 bar	associations	 entirely	 separate	 from	 the	 Myanmar	 state,	 with	examples	 such	 as	 the	 Yangon	 Bar	 Association,	 Mandalay	 Bar	Association,	and	Mon	Bar	Association,	but	these	never	held	powers	to	regulate	the	legal	profession	and	were	denied	legal	registration	when	 the	 State	 Law	 and	 Order	 Restoration	 Council	 (“SLORC”)	seized	power.32	These	entities	 continue	 to	exist,	 but	 as	 local	bar	associations	without	 the	 power	 to	 regulate	 the	 legal	 profession,	they	 fall	 short	 of	 the	 ideal	 for	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association.	In	such	a	context,	ILAM	is	an	attempt	to	rectify	the	lack	of	an	independent	legal	profession	in	Myanmar	and	reflects	a	number	of	separate	 but	 related	 efforts	 involving	 the	 IBA,	 the	 Myanmar	government,	and	pre-existing	Myanmar	regional	bar	associations	and	 lawyer	 groups.	 Covering	 the	 years	 2014-2016,	 the	 IBAHRI	program	sought	to	(1)	gather	support	in	Myanmar	for	a	national	bar	association,	(2)	establish	and	build	capacity	for	a	national	bar	association	as	a	legally	registered	independent	professional	body,	and	(3)	encourage	reforms	regarding	the	legal	profession	allowing	an	 independent	national	bar	association.33	The	program	came	 in	the	wake	 of	 prior	 exploratory	 activities	 by	 the	 IBA	 in	Myanmar	
                                                             29.	 	Bar	Council	Act	1929,	supra	note	26.	30.	 Bar	 Council	 Act	 Amendment	 of	 1989	 (Union	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Myanmar	1989),	 available	 at:	 https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Myanmar-Bar-Council-Act-and-amendments-legislation-1926-eng.pdf	[https://perma.cc/7A23-Z5K5]	[hereinafter	Bar	Council	Act	Amendment	1989];	Courts	Manual	1999,	supra	note	26.	31.	 Kham	2014,	supra	note	25.	32.	 IBA	2012a,	supra	note	25;	ICJ	2013,	supra	note	25.	33.	 IBA	2015b,	supra	note	1.	
1142	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	which	included	an	August	2012	fact-finding	mission	that	led	to	a	December	 2012	 report	 and	 subsequent	 January	 2013	 panel	 to	discuss	the	state	of	rule-of-law	in	Myanmar.34	The	impetus	for	IBA	efforts	 in	 regards	 to	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	 association	 in	Myanmar	grew	with	a	July	2013	scoping	mission	that	assessed	the	ways	 in	which	 the	 IBA	 could	 aid	 reform	 in	 support	 of	 the	 legal	profession.35	 It	 was	 after	 the	 scoping	 mission	 that	 the	 IBA	committed	 to	 promoting	 through	 its	 IBAHRI	 an	 independent	national	bar	association	in	Myanmar.	For	its	part,	beginning	in	2014,	the	IBAHRI	program	oversaw	a	series	of	events	that	progressed	towards	the	formation	of	ILAM.	In	partnership	with	the	Myanmar	Parliament’s	Committee	on	Law	and	Tranquility,	which	was	led	by	its	Chair	Daw	Aung	San	Suu	Kyi,	the	 IBAHRI	 hosted	 a	 February	 2014	 seminar	 in	 the	 capital	 of	Naypidaw	 addressing	 international	 standards	 for	 bar	associations.36	 Accompanied	 by	 a	 report	 on	 the	 roles	 of	 bar	associations,	 the	 seminar	 assembled	 international	 experts	 and	Myanmar	stakeholders	to	discuss	globally	accepted	best	practices	for	 bar	 associations,	 different	 models	 for	 bar	 associations,	 and	generate	 recommendations	 for	 the	 reform	 of	 Myanmar’s	 legal	profession.37	The	outcomes	of	the	seminar	included	a	statement	to	form	an	independent	national	bar	association	for	Myanmar	and	the	assembly	of	a	steering	committee	to	lead	a	national	effort	towards	
                                                             34.	 Panel	Discussion—The	Rule	of	Law	in	Myanmar:	Challenges	and	Prospects,	 INT’L	BAR	 ASS’N	 (2013),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=c68828b3-9c10-48a7-a1c7-f5d394b63cc9	 [https://perma.cc/Y6US-DKBH];	 Myanmar/Burma	 Fact-finding	 Mission,	INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (2012),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=DEBA1058-8D8D-47E3-B8DB-1BA2BA82E40E	[https://perma.cc/4YUS-NQW7].	35.	 	 Myanmar/Burma	 Country	 Visit	 2013.,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (2013),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=7481efba-7855-4bd2-9af7-7cf71fe1ab43	[https://perma.cc/D2SN-RCX4].	36.	 Myanmar:	Major	Legal	Seminar	on	Bar	Associations’	Best	Practices	to	be	Hosted	by	
IBAHRI,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (2014f),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=ce33cd81-eb78-4209-9ca2-8a9338c17327	[https://perma.cc/D3KE-46KT]	[hereinafter	IBA	2014f].	37.	 	Understanding	Bar	Associations	 and	Their	 Roles	 and	Responsibilities,	 INT’L	BAR	ASS’N	 (2014e),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=6a0a6d72-09ef-4976-8cec-df30c9674f05	 [https://perma.cc/JJ2T-VJ9T]	 [hereinafter	 Understanding	 Bar	Associations].		
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1143	that	goal.38	The	steering	committee,	composed	of	representatives	from	Myanmar’s	regional	bar	associations	and	lawyer	groups,	held	three	meetings	over	the	course	of	2014	to	draft	a	constitution	for	an	 independent	 national	 bar	 association.39	 Concurrent	 to	 the	steering	committee	meetings,	 in	conjunction	with	Daw	Aung	San	Suu	Kyi	and	the	Myanmar	Parliament’s	Committee	on	Rule	of	Law	and	Tranquility,	 the	 IBAHRI	held	an	October	2014	workshop	on	reform	 of	 Myanmar	 laws	 regarding	 the	 legal	 profession.	 The	workshop	 provided	 a	 comparative	 review	 of	 laws	 from	 other	countries	with	discussions	on	enacting	Myanmar	legislation	more	consistent	 with	 international	 standards	 for	 the	 regulation	 of	lawyers.40	The	work	of	the	steering	committee	led	to	a	general	assembly	in	March	2015	to	endorse	a	draft	constitution	for	an	independent,	representative	 national	 bar	 association	 that	 would	 be	 called	ILAM.41	 In	 support	 of	 ILAM,	 the	 IBAHRI	 held	 fifteen	workshops	throughout	 the	 various	 states	 and	 administrative	 regions	 of	Myanmar	to	prepare	the	first	elections	for	ILAM’s	leadership.42	The	elections	were	held	in	September	2015,43	and	in	January	2016,	the	IBA,	 along	 with	 Daw	 Aung	 San	 Suu	 Kyi,	 opened	 the	 inaugural	
                                                             38.	 Myanmar’s	Legal	Profession	Moves	to	Establish	a	National	Bar	Association,	 INT’L	BAR	 ASS’N	 (2014d),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=4670e898-428b-440d-b986-52b35593d40d	[https://perma.cc/9UPJ-CTDZ].	39.	 Myanmar	 Lawyers	 Advance	 in	 Mission	 to	 Build	 a	 Representative	 National	 Bar	
Association,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (2014c),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=2efce9cc-5ef9-4dde-86e4-024648d54b93	 [https://perma.cc/UNR8-RKK7]	 [hereinafter	 Myanmar	 Lawyers	Advance].	40.	 	Laws	 Regulating	 the	 Legal	 Profession:	 A	 Comparative	 Review	 from	Around	 the	
World,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (2014a),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=14490A0D-F6C4-4E12-AE48-A4D730D0CDE4	 [https://perma.cc/9ENH-DYWC]	 [hereinafter	 A	 Comparative	Review];	Myanmar:	IBAHRI	Host	Workshop	on	Laws	Governing	Legal	Profession	with	Daw	
Aung	 San	 Suu	 Kyi	 (2014b),	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=5d4e7549-e00e-46ed-8c4c-2a0c421db55a	[https://perma.cc/L4L4-WZKM].	41.	 	IBAHRI	and	Myanmar	Lawyers	Prepare	for	First	Independent	Lawyers’	Association	
Elections	 (2015a),	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=96554c4d-8391-4f10-9955-d5c1ba10f019	[https://perma.cc/W32Y-X9NE]	[hereinafter	IBAHRI	and	Myanmar	Lawyers	Prepare].		42.	 Id.	43.	 Id.	
1144	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	meeting	of	ILAM.44	At	its	first	meeting,	ILAM’s	Central	Committee	adopted	 its	 constitution,	 elected	 a	 Central	 Executive	 Committee,	and	set	an	agenda	for	committees	and	attendant	action	plans.45	The	IBA	maintained	 its	presence	during	the	remainder	of	2016,	with	IBA	 representatives	 participating	 in	 ILAM	 events	 later	 in	 the	year.46	 ILAM	 became	 a	 legally	 registered	 entity	 in	 November	2016,47	effectively	marking	the	culmination	of	the	IBAHRI’s	three-year	program	in	Myanmar.	A	 number	 of	 observations	 should	 be	 noted	 regarding	 the	IBAHRI	program	for	ILAM.	First,	the	work	of	the	IBAHRI	should	not	be	construed	as	the	only	effort	in	Myanmar	for	an	independent	bar	association.	 The	 IBA’s	 three-year	 program	 for	 the	 IBAHRI	 was	driven	in	part	by	a	desire	to	instigate	progress	on	an	issue	that	the	IBA	perceived	as	suffering	from	a	lack	of	action	by	local	actors.48	The	accuracy	of	such	sentiments,	however,	is	uncertain	in	that	the	IBAHRI’s	 program	 overlaid	 pre-existing	 endemic	 efforts	 within	Myanmar	 for	a	nation-wide	bar	association	 independent	of	state	control.	 For	 example,	 organizations	 in	 Myanmar’s	 various	administrative	 regions	 such	 as	 the	 Yangon	 Bar	 Association,	Mandalay	Bar	Association,	 and	Mon	Bar	Association	 in	 the	 time	prior	 to	 the	 IBAHRI’s	arrival	had	sought	 in	various	ways	 to	 lead	their	own	diverse	campaigns	for	their	respective	conceptions	of	an	independent	national	association	of	 lawyers.49	In	addition,	at	the	time	 of	 the	 IBA’s	 activities	 in	 2012	 and	 2013,	 there	 had	 been	ongoing	 efforts	 to	 promote	 a	 Myanmar	 Lawyers’	 Association	(“MLA”)	sometimes	also	called	the	Myanmar	Lawyers’	Network	or	MLN)	and	a	Myanmar	Legal	Aid	Network	(“MLAN”).50	As	part	of	
                                                             44.	 IBA	President	and	Aung	San	Suu	Kyi	Open	Inaugural	Meeting	of	Myanmar’s	First	
National	 Independent	 Lawyers’	 Association,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (2016b),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=67923557-0f67-403c-ad67-ff04adc4ac52	[https://perma.cc/AQ6Z-8427].	45.	 Id.	46.	 Myanmar	Lawyers	Attend	Workshop	Promoting	Legal	Ethics.	 (2016a),	 INT’L	BAR	ASS’N	available	at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=aaf379c9-100a-4403-b06b-ca659db6646f	[https://perma.cc/3FEZ-GGSE].	47.	 Independent	 Lawyers’	 Association	 of	 Myanmar	 (ILAM),	 available	 at:	http://www.ilam.org.mm/en/pages/1	 [https://perma.cc/GB65-CJYP]	 [hereinafter	 cited	as	ILAM	2017].	48.	 Interviews	IBA	2014;	Interviews	IBA	2015;	Interviews	IBA	2016.	49.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015.	50.	 Nick	 Cheesman	 &	 Kyaw	 Min	 San,	 Not	 Just	 Defending;	 Advocating	 for	 Law	 in	
Myanmar,	31	WIS.	INT’L	L.	J.	718-19	(2014).	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1145	their	respective	organizational	purposes,	both	the	MLA	and	MLAN	held	 goals	 similar	 to	 the	 IBA’s	 aspiration	 to	 advocate	 for	 an	independent	 bar	 and	 reform	 of	 laws	 regarding	 the	 legal	profession.51	 The	 MLA	 had	 gone	 so	 far	 as	 to	 convene	 its	 first	meeting	in	June	2012	and	MLAN	had	used	its	connections	to	the	South	East	Asia	Legal	Aid	Network	to	hold	workshops	throughout	2012.52	As	a	result,	the	notion	of	an	independent	bar	association	in	Myanmar	was	 not	 unique	 to	 the	 IBA,	 such	 that	 the	work	 of	 the	IBAHRI	 actually	 represented	 an	 introduction	 of	 an	 additional	foreign	 presence	 to	 a	 domestic	 space	 of	 local	 actors	 espousing	different	interpretations	of	the	same	idea.	Second,	the	activities	of	the	IBAHRI	were	not	without	tension	in	 relation	 to	 domestic	 Myanmar	 perspectives.	 The	 tensions	between	IBAHRI	and	local	perspectives	manifested	themselves	in	multiple	 ways.	 For	 example,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 IBAHRI’s	program	over	pre-existing	local	efforts	for	an	independent	national	bar	association	appeared	to	some	Myanmar	actors	as	an	effort	to	supplant	 a	 foreign	 actor	 over	 domestic	 perspectives.53	 IBAHRI	representatives	asserted	that	the	program	was	a	Myanmar-driven	initiative	that	sought	to	be	inclusive	in	its	approach	by	involving	representatives	of	 lawyer	organizations	from	Myanmar’s	various	administrative	regions,	but	the	sentiments	over	foreign	intrusion	extended	to	the	IBAHRI’s	seminars	and	workshops.	In	particular,	some	Myanmar	attendees	in	the	IBAHRI’s	2014	events	saw	them	as	 being	 controlled	 by	 foreign	 experts	 following	 an	 agenda	 that	was	unresponsive	to	local	concerns	and	which	impeded	initiatives	of	 Myanmar	 participants	 to	 further	 those	 concerns.54	 These	perceptions	may	have	arisen	from	the	nature	of	IBAHRI’s	program,	which	sought	 to	balance	 IBA	desires	 for	 the	 inclusion	of	diverse	local	 perspectives,	 both	 from	 Myanmar	 government	 and	 civil	society,	 while	 still	 conforming	 to	 IBA	 goals	 to	 promote	international	 standards	 for	 the	 legal	 profession.	 The	 IBAHRI’s	compromise,	 however,	 was	 still	 perceived	 by	 a	 number	 of	Myanmar	participants	in	the	February	2014	seminar	and	October	2014	workshop	as	weighted	against	Myanmar	perspectives	since	(1)	many,	if	not	the	majority,	of	seminar	participants	were	experts	
                                                             51.	 Id.		52.	 Id.	53.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016;	Interviews	ILAM	2017.	54.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016;	Interviews	ILAM	2017.	
1146	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	from	the	West	rather	than	Asia,	and	hence	were	perceived	as	being	less	responsive	to	the	contextual	challenges	in	Myanmar,	and	(2)	much,	if	not	most,	of	the	seminar,	seemed	to	be	more	focused	on	instruction	delivered	by	Western	experts	to	Myanmar	participants,	rather	 than	 being	 a	 collaborative	 endeavor	 involving	 Myanmar	actors	 in	 the	 development	 of	 an	 action	 plan	 affecting	 their	interests.55	The	disjuncture	between	IBAHRI	and	Myanmar	views	carried	over	 into	the	2014	steering	committee	meetings	 for	 ILAM.	Some	Myanmar	participants	indicated	an	appreciation	for	the	presence	of	 the	 IBA	 because	 of	 its	 international	 stature	 and	 attendant	capacity	 to	 muster	 consultative	 resources,	 legitimacy	 with	domestic	and	foreign	actors,	and	approval	from	the	Myanmar	state,	but	they	also	noted	that	the	IBA’s	stature	pushed	IBA	goals	at	the	expense	 of	 local	 concerns.56	 Myanmar	 participants	 perceived	IBAHRI	 activities	 as	 adhering	 to	 a	 “checklist”	 of	 preferences	invariably	 tied	 to	 IBA	conceptions	of	 international	 standards	 for	the	 legal	 profession.57	 This	 contrasted	 with	 local	 desires	 to	structure	the	organization	and	procedures	of	ILAM	in	a	way	that	could	 alleviate	 discontent	 from	 potentially	 competing	 for	 pre-existing	 domestic	 efforts	 to	 create	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association	 and	 appease	 the	 concerns	 of	 potentially	 obstructive	actions	from	Myanmar	government	concerned	about	the	threat	of	ILAM	to	government	authority.58	The	division,	in	essence,	reflected	a	divergence	between	foreign	IBA	interests	ostensibly	advancing	international	 ideals	 versus	 local	 Myanmar	 interests	 seeking	 to	respond	 to	 local	 political	 realities.	 The	 tensions	 arose	 over	perceptions	 that,	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 ILAM,	 the	 IBAHRI	 was	directing	 the	agenda	to	 favor	 IBA	 ideals	without	regard	 for	 local	realities.	
                                                             55.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016.	56.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016.	57.	 	IBA	International	Principles	on	Conduct	for	the	Legal	Profession,	INT’L	BAR	ASS’N	(2011),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=1730FC33-6D70-4469-9B9D-8A12C319468C	 [https://perma.cc/M6F5-KWNF];	 IBA	 Standards	 for	 the	
Independence	 of	 the	 Legal	 Profession,	 INT’L	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (1990),	 available	 at:	https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=F68BBBA5-FD1F-426F-9AA5-48D26B5E72E7	[https://perma.cc/964C-GXRU].	58.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015.	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1147	Third,	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 IBAHRI	 program	 did	 not	represent	 the	 conclusion	 of	 ILAM’s	 formation.	 As	 of	 November	2018,	the	status	of	ILAM	was	still	unfinished	in	several	respects.	To	begin	with,	representatives	of	ILAM’s	leadership	observe	that	the	organization	 is	 not	 fixed	 and	 that	 it	 will	 continue	 to	 evolve	 in	response	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 its	 constituency	 and	 changes	 in	Myanmar’s	 regulation	of	 the	 legal	profession.59	For	example,	 the	ILAM	constitution	was	amended	in	December	2017	and	is	subject	to	 further	amendments	 in	the	 future.60	 In	addition,	 the	nature	of	ILAM	is	not	assured.	While	ILAM	may	be	independent	in	terms	of	being	outside	state	control,	it	is	not	independent	in	terms	of	being	self-sufficient.	 ILAM	 relies	 upon	membership	 revenues,61	 and	 so	must	justify	its	membership	dues	to	a	market	of	Myanmar	lawyers	whose	financial	resources	are	constrained	by	Myanmar’s	economic	underdevelopment.	Further,	ILAM	is	not	a	sole	actor,	as	the	bar	associations	and	lawyer	organizations	present	at	the	start	of	the	IBAHRI	program	continue	 to	 operate.	 While	 the	 IBAHRI	 sought	 to	 include	 these	entities	in	the	formation	of	ILAM,	their	persistence	as	concurrent	entities	means	 that	 ILAM	must	 find	a	way	 to	 justify	 its	presence	alongside	 their	 presence	 to	 the	 same	 community	 of	 Myanmar	lawyers.	This	requires	that	ILAM	identify	a	role	that	differentiates	ILAM	 from	 Myanmar’s	 other	 bar	 associations	 and	 lawyer	organizations	to	a	degree	sufficient	to	garner	enough	membership	dues	 to	 sustain	 ILAM’s	 existence.62	 In	 addition,	 ILAM’s	 role	 is	uncertain.	ILAM	seeks	to	justify	its	existence	to	Myanmar	lawyers	not	just	in	terms	of	its	distinction	from	other	bar	associations	or	lawyer	 organizations	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 base	 value.	 For	example,	 in	an	attempt	 to	match	 the	powers	of	 independent	bar	associations	 in	 other	 countries,	 ILAM	 sought	 a	 role	 in	 legal	education.	 This	 effort,	 however,	 was	 rejected	 by	 Myanmar	universities.63	 Because	 of	 the	 Bar	 Council	 Act,	 ILAM	 lacks	 the	authority	 of	 comparable	 independent	 bar	 associations	 in	 other	countries	to	control	licensing,	standards,	or	discipline	of	the	legal	profession.	As	a	result,	as	of	November	2018,	ILAM	has	sought	to	
                                                             59.	 Interviews	ILAM	Secretariat	2017.	60.	 Id.	61.	 Id.	62.	 Interviews	ILAM	Secretariat	2017.	63.	 Interviews	ILAM	Secretariat	2017.	
1148	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	orient	its	activities	around	an	agenda	that	includes	skills	training	for	practicing	lawyers,	advocacy	on	behalf	of	the	legal	profession,	promotion	of	pro	bono	services,	certification	of	quality	standards,	and	 liaison	 with	 international	 organizations.64	 These	 functions,	however,	are	subject	to	change	as	a	matter	of	supporting	ILAM’s	future	existence.	Last,	the	formation	of	ILAM	was	tied	to	an	attendant	IBAHRI	goal	of	reforming	Myanmar’s	laws	to	reduce	state	control	over	the	legal	 profession.	 As	 much	 as	 ILAM	 is	 outside	 state	 control,	Myanmar’s	 legal	 profession	 continues	 to	 be	 held	 under	 state	authority	by	the	constraints	of	the	Bar	Council	Act	of	1929	and	the	Bar	 Council	 Act	 Amendment	 of	 1989.	 While	 the	 Myanmar	government	has	acknowledged	the	IBAHRI’s	call	for	reform	of	the	two	acts	to	reduce	the	power	of	the	Bar	Council	over	Myanmar’s	lawyers,	the	government	as	of	November	2018	has	not	amended	the	acts	or	pursued	further	change	in	Myanmar’s	 laws	regarding	the	 legal	 profession.65	 As	 a	 result,	 ILAM	 is	 still	 advocates	 for	powers	held	by	 independent	bar	 associations	 in	other	 countries	regarding	the	regulation	of	the	legal	profession.66	
IV.	ILAM	AS	A	LEGAL	TRANSPLANT	The	work	of	the	IBAHRI	in	nurturing	the	formation	of	ILAM	exhibits	 a	 number	 of	 nuances	 with	 implications	 for	 Tuebner’s	conception	 of	 legal	 transplants:	 the	 distinction	 between	 an	institution	versus	an	idea	in	the	transplant	of	a	legal	concept,	the	different	 motivations	 driving	 divergent	 interpretations	 of	 a	transplanted	idea,	and	the	proportionality	of	the	dialectic	between	legal	and	social	transformation.	In	making	comments	on	each,	it	is	useful	to	highlight	particular	elements	in	the	events	tied	to	the	rise	of	ILAM.	The	association	between	nuances	and	respective	events	is	discussed	individually	below.	
                                                             64.	 Interviews	ILAM	Secretariat	2017.	65.	 Aung	Kyaw	Min,	Move	to	Amend	Bar	Law	Gains	Steam,	MYANMAR	TIMES	(May	26,	2018),	 https://www.mmtimes.com/news/move-amend-bar-law-gains-steam.html	[https://perma.cc/BJP8-Z9SN].	66.	 Id.	
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A.	Transplant	of	an	Institution	Versus	an	Idea	To	begin	with,	a	discussion	of	ILAM	within	the	framework	of	legal	transplants	should	be	conducted	with	a	distinction	between	a	 transplant	 of	 a	 legal	 institution	 versus	 a	 transplant	 of	 a	 legal	idea.67	 The	 efforts	 of	 the	 IBAHRI	 program	 involved	 different	components,	with	the	IBAHRI’s	pursuit	of	ILAM	as	an	organization	being	 an	 institutional	 expression	 of	 an	 idea	 regarding	 an	independent	national	bar	association.68	The	distinction	is	relevant	because	it	points	to	a	source	for	the	tensions	between	the	IBA	and	Myanmar	actors	in	the	formation	of	ILAM.69	The	IBAHRI	program	was	launched	in	the	space	of	pre-existing	local	bar	associations	and	lawyer	 organizations	 which	 had	 been	 engaged	 in	 their	 own	respective	 efforts	 to	 create	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association	before	the	instigation	of	the	IBAHRI.70	This	means	that	in	 its	 basic	 form,	 the	 notion	 of	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association	was	already	being	held	in	principle	by	Myanmar	actors	prior	to	the	arrival	of	the	IBA.71	In	addition,	it	was	also	accepted	by	the	Myanmar	 state,	 with	 both	 the	 government	 before	 the	 2015	election	and	the	government	after	the	2015	election	supporting	the	concept	of	a	nationwide	bar	association	outside	of	state	control.72	As	a	result,	the	issues	raised	by	Myanmar	actors	with	the	IBAHRI	program	were	less	about	the	IBAHRI’s	work	to	promote	a	legal	idea	and	more	about	the	IBAHRI’s	agenda	to	implant	a	legal	institution.	For	its	part,	the	IBAHRI	program	held	to	a	goal	of	fostering	a	Myanmar-led	 movement,	 but	 Myanmar	 participants	 in	 the	program	 indicated	 issues	 with	 regard	 to	 (1)	 the	 relationship	between	 ILAM	 and	 ongoing	 local	 efforts	 for	 an	 independent	national	bar	association,	and	(2)	the	differences	between	IBA	and	local	 preferences	 for	 the	 organizational	 composition	 of	 ILAM	 in	structure,	procedures,	and	agenda.	With	respect	to	the	relationship	between	 ILAM	 and	 local	 efforts,	 the	 IBAHRI	 program	 sought	 to	encourage	 a	 pluralist	 process	 inclusive	 of	 pre-existing	 bar	associations	and	lawyer	organizations	in	Myanmar.73	This	did	not,	
                                                             67.	 IBA	2014f,	supra	note	36.	68.	 Understanding	Bar	Associations,	supra	note	37.		69.	 Myanmar	Lawyers	Advance,	supra	note	39.	70.	 IBAHRI	and	Myanmar	Lawyers	Prepare,	supra	note	41.	71.	 Interviews	IBA	2014.		72.	 Cheesman	&	Min	San,	supra	note	50.	73.	 Interviews	IBA	2014;	Interviews	IBA	2015;	Interviews	IBA	2016.	
1150	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	however,	result	 in	Myanmar	 legal	actors	subsuming	their	efforts	for	 their	 own	 respective	 plans	 for	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association.	 Rather,	 they	 supported	 the	 creation	 of	 ILAM	 to	 the	extent	 that	 it	 existed	 concurrent	 with	 ongoing	 local	 lawyer	organizations.	With	 respect	 to	 the	 differences	 between	 IBA	 and	local	 preferences	 for	 ILAM	 itself,	 Myanmar	 participants	 in	 the	IBAHRI	program	noted	the	IBA’s	disapproval	of	 the	drafts	of	 the	ILAM	constitution,	with	the	IBAHRI’s	insistence	on	IBA	articulation	of	 international	 standards	 for	 bar	 associations	 being	 seen	 by	Myanmar	 participants	 as	 conflicting	with	 the	work	 of	Myanmar	actors	 on	 the	 ILAM	 constitution.74	 Specifically,	 IBA	 preferences	were	 for	 an	 egalitarian	 structure	 that	 favored	 qualities	 such	 as	decentralized	 authority,	 collective	 decision-making,	 direct	elections	 of	 executives,	 and	 inclusive	 opportunities	 that	 pro-actively	sought	the	participation	of	women	and	youth	in	leadership	positions.75	 In	 contrast,	 Myanmar	 members	 of	 the	 ILAM	constitution’s	 steering	 committee	 sought	 a	 hierarchical	organization	 with	 centralized	 authority,	 leadership	 tied	 to	seniority	 and	 experience,	 and	 an	 aversion	 or	 delay	 in	 diversity	initiatives.76	Myanmar	 participants	 had	 attempted	 to	 engage	 with	 the	IBAHRI	 program	 over	 such	 differences	 but	 argued	 that	 the	 IBA	directed	 the	 IBAHRI	agenda	 in	ways	 that	 afforded	 little	 room	 to	address	 local	 concerns.	 The	 disjuncture	 between	 the	 IBA	 and	Myanmar	participants	in	the	IBAHRI	program	were	great	enough	that	 Myanmar	 legal	 actors	 felt	 compelled	 to	 hold	 their	 own	discussions	 informally	 independent	 of	 the	 IBAHRI	 to	 demarcate	their	positions	relative	to	the	IBA	on	both	the	question	of	ILAM’s	relationship	 with	 concurrent	 local	 efforts	 for	 an	 independent	national	 bar	 association	 and	 ILAM’s	 composition	 as	 an	organization.77	 Ultimately,	 their	 positions	 turned	 to	 essentially	making	ILAM	indeterminate,	with	ILAM	left	to	define	its	own	role	among	 existing	 bar	 associations	 and	 lawyer	 organizations	 and	ILAM	having	a	constitution	that	would	initially	adhere	to	Myanmar	preferences	but	would	be	subject	to	potential	later	amendments.78	
                                                             74.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016.	75.	 Interviews	IBA	2014;	Interviews	IBA	2015;	Interviews	IBA	2016.	76.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016;	Interviews	ILAM	2017.	77.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016.	78.	 Interviews	ILAM	Secretariat	2017.	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1151	Such	 a	 scenario	 suggests	 that	 the	 changes	 foreseen	 by	Tuebner’s	conception	of	legal	irritants	do	not	always	result	in	an	identifiable	 transformation,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 a	transformation	with	a	conclusion.79	Teubner	sees	legal	irritants	as	spurring	 an	 evolutionary	 dynamic	 in	 which	 an	 external	 idea	 is	reconstructed	and	an	internal	context	is	changed	in	responding	to	the	external	idea.80	As	much	as	the	IBAHRI’s	work	to	develop	ILAM	was	 an	 external	 idea	 of	 the	 IBA	 spurring	movement	 internal	 to	Myanmar,	 it	 did	 not	 lead	 entirely	 to	 reconstruction	 or	 internal	change.81	Myanmar	legal	actors	agreed	with	the	IBA	on	the	idea	of	an	 independent	 national	 bar	 association	 and	 engaged	 with	 the	IBAHRI	to	advance	the	idea.82	As	a	result,	the	issues	were	less	about	reconstruction	and	more	acceptance	of	 ILAM	as	 the	 institutional	representation	of	a	shared	idea.83	The	formation	of	ILAM,	however,	fomented	limited	internal	change	among	Myanmar	legal	actors,	in	that	(1)	local	bar	associations	and	lawyer	organizations	continued	to	exist	concurrent	to	ILAM,	(2)	the	Myanmar	government	did	not	change	the	laws	regarding	the	legal	profession,	and	(3)	ILAM	did	not	achieve	the	goal	of	an	independent	national	bar	association.84	It	 is	 possible	 to	 place	 the	 IBAHRI	 and	 ILAM	 as	 expressions	 of	unexpected	consequences	that	Teubner	expects	to	arise	from	legal	irritants,	but	their	experiences	do	not	entirely	reflect	the	changes	in	external	ideas	or	internal	contexts	he	envisioned.85	It	is	possible	to	resolve	such	apparent	inconsistency	by	noting	that	the	state	of	both	the	idea	of	an	independent	national	bar	association	and	the	institution	of	ILAM	is	not	resolved,	with	both	still	part	of	ongoing,	unfinished	efforts	to	advance	them	in	Myanmar.	As	a	result,	neither	status	 is	 static,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 are	 still	 undergoing	 the	evolutionary	dynamic	posed	by	Teubner.	In	this	case,	the	IBAHRI’s	work	 to	 form	 ILAM	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 demonstrating	 an	interpretation	 of	 Tuebner’s	 legal	 irritants	 as	 involved	 in	 a	continual,	 ongoing	 evolutionary	 dynamic	 that	 should	 not	 be	expected	to	end.86	
                                                             
79.	 See	generally	Crouch,	supra	note	21.		80.	 IBA	2015b,	supra	note	1.	81.	 IBA	2014f,	supra	note	36.	82.	 Understanding	Bar	Associations,	supra	note	37.	83.	 Myanmar	Lawyers	Advance,	supra	note	39.	84.	 IBAHRI	and	Myanmar	Lawyers	Prepare,	supra	note	41.	85.	 Cheesman	&	Min	San,	supra	note	50.	86.	 Id.	
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B.	Motivations	Underlying	Divergent	Interpretations	The	disjuncture	between	 IBA	and	Myanmar	perspectives	 in	the	 IBAHRI	 program	 reflected	 differences	 in	motivations.87	 It	 is	useful	 to	 recognize	 these	differences	 since	 they	 identify	 another	source	of	tension	in	the	formation	of	ILAM.88	In	instigating	a	project	for	 an	 independent	national	bar	 association	 in	 the	midst	of	pre-existing	local	efforts	for	the	same	idea,	the	IBAHRI	program	sought	to	provide	IBA	support	for	a	concept	that	it	perceived	as	suffering	from	a	lack	of	local	action.89	The	IBAHRI	program	was	not	directed	solely	towards	technical	support,	since	it	also	provided	alternative	means	 of	 support	 in	 the	 form	 of	 consultation	 and	 advocacy	 for	Myanmar	 participants	 and	 Myanmar	 government	 towards	international	 standards	 for	 bar	 associations.90	 The	 Myanmar	participants	 in	 the	 IBAHRI	 program	 acknowledged	 that	 in	 the	decades	 of	 Myanmar’s	 isolation,	 their	 respective	 efforts	 had	struggled	 to	 coalesce	 into	 substantive	 progress	 against	 the	Myanmar	state.91	They	also	recognized	the	value	of	support	from	an	international	organization	with	the	stature	of	the	IBA,	in	that	as	an	 international	 entity	with	 an	 established	global	 reputation	 for	advocacy	on	legal	issues	the	IBA	had	the	legitimacy	to	(1)	muster	international	donors	to	provide	financial	support	for	legal	reform	efforts	 such	 as	 ILAM,	 (2)	 assemble	 international	 expertise	 in	forums	convening	foreign	and	local	actors	for	networking,	agenda-setting,	 discussion,	 and	 training;	 (3)	 supersede	 existing	 local	conflicts	between	rival	voices—both	between	and	amongst	state	and	 non-state	 actors—regarding	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 independent	national	bar	and	work	to	provoke	a	common	forum	for	contending	local	actors;	and	(4)	nurture	support	from	the	Myanmar	state	for	progress	towards	an	independent	national	bar	association.92	Such	 recognition,	 however,	 did	 not	 avert	 the	 tensions	between	the	IBA	and	the	Myanmar	perspectives	regarding	ILAM.	The	agenda	of	the	IBAHRI	program	and	its	preferences	for	ILAM	were	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 IBA’s	 purpose	 as	 a	 global	 advocate	promoting	 international	 standards	 for	 the	 legal	 profession.	 As	 a	
                                                             87.	 Understanding	Bar	Associations,	supra	note	37.		88.	 A	Comparative	Review,	supra	note	40.		89.	 IBAHRI	and	Myanmar	Lawyers	Prepare,	supra	note	41		90.	 Interviews	IBA	2014;	Interviews	IBA	2015;	Interviews	IBA	2016.	91.	 Interviews	ILAM	2016.	92.	 Interviews	ILAM	2016.	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1153	result,	despite	its	goals	for	a	Myanmar-led	movement,	the	IBAHRI	program	also	sought	to	advance	IBA	priorities	in	keeping	with	IBA	ideals	 for	an	 independent	national	bar	association.93	 In	contrast,	the	concerns	of	Myanmar	participants	in	the	program	were	tied	to	the	potential	challenges	posed	by	both	pre-existing	domestic	legal	actors	with	their	respective	interests	and	a	Myanmar	state	that	had	historically	denied	independence	to	the	 legal	profession.94	These	concerns	have	not	 abated:	 even	with	 the	 formal	 inauguration	of	ILAM,	 the	 pre-existing	 local	 efforts	 for	 independent	 bar	associations	continued,	and	the	Myanmar	state	did	not	change	the	status	quo	in	its	laws	to	allow	an	independent	bar	association.	As	a	result,	 in	 drafting	 the	 ILAM	 constitution	 the	 members	 of	 the	steering	committee	diverged	from	the	IBA’s	priorities	and	instead	held	 to	 concerns	 they	 saw	 as	 necessary	 to	 address	 such	 local	realities.95	 This	 meant	 mitigating	 potential	 dangers	 by	 leaving	ILAM	 indeterminate	 in	 role	 or	 composition	 such	 that	 it	 had	 the	flexibility	to	exercise	pragmatic	actions	to	ensure	its	survival.	This	included	 having	 the	 initial	 constitution	 for	 ILAM	 subordinate	diversity	initiatives	in	lieu	of	a	hierarchical	management	structure	that	appeased	local	legal	actors	by	offering	positions	of	authority	to	their	senior	leadership.	For	Teubner,	the	issues	in	differing	motivations	offer	further	depth	 in	 the	 study	 of	 legal	 irritants.	 In	 identifying	 the	 interests	driving	 the	 behavior	 of	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 evolutionary	dynamic	 of	 external	 idea	 and	 internal	 context,	 the	 attention	 to	motivation	also	helps	to	highlight	the	character	of	such	a	dynamic	in	terms	of	its	contentiousness.96	In	the	case	of	ILAM,	sympathetic	interests	 for	 the	 idea	of	an	 independent	national	bar	association	led	to	engagement	by	Myanmar	legal	actors—both	the	government	and	non-state	 entities—in	 the	 IBAHRI,	while	 divergent	 interests	with	respect	to	ILAM	as	the	organizational	expression	of	that	idea	led	 to	 tensions	 regarding	 the	 composition	 of	 ILAM	 and	 left	uncertainties	in	its	role	in	the	Myanmar	legal	landscape.97	Even	as	much	as	these	outcomes	continue	to	be	unresolved,	they	suggest	that	 the	 changes,	 whether	 upon	 an	 external	 idea	 or	 an	 internal	
                                                             93.	 IBA	2015b,	supra	note	1.	94.	 IBA	International	Principles	on	Conduct,	supra	note	55.	95.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015.	96.	 See	generally	Crouch,	supra	note	24.	97.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016.	
1154	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	context,	spurred	by	a	legal	irritant	can	vary	in	character,	with	the	nature	of	change	affected	by	the	alignment	of	interests	among	the	various	 external	 and	 internal	 agents	 of	 change.	 Following	 the	experiences	of	the	IBAHRI	and	ILAM,	in	areas	where	motivations	are	 parallel	 the	 character	 of	 change	 is	 relatively	 tranquil,	 but	 in	areas	where	motivations	are	divergent	the	character	of	change	is	more	contentious.	
C.	Proportionality	in	the	Dialectic	Between	Legal	and	Social	
Transformation	The	 formation	 of	 ILAM	 arguably	 represented	 Teubner’s	conception	 of	 a	 legal	 transplant	 via	 a	 legal	 irritant.	 The	 IBAHRI	program	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 an	 irritant	 that	 motivated	 action	among	Myanmar	legal	actors	towards	the	idea	of	an	independent	national	bar	association.98	Teubner	saw	the	process	of	irritation	as	involving	a	mechanism	that	affected	change	within	a	local	context	but	which	was	also	affected	by	that	context.99	The	creation	of	ILAM	was	 consistent	with	 this,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 IBAHRI	 program	sought	 to	 follow	 IBA	 ideals	 for	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association	but	was	affected	by	Myanmar	participants	to	produce	an	ILAM	that	reflected	local	concerns.100	Teubner,	 however,	 also	 saw	 irritation	 as	 having	 two	components:	legal	transformation	and	social	transformation,	with	the	 two	 involved	 in	 a	 circular	 co-evolutionary	 dynamic.	 Such	 a	conception	suggests	a	proportional	dialectic,	as	much	between	law	and	 society,	 as	 it	 is	 between	 foreign	 and	 domestic.101	 The	development	of	ILAM	diverges	from	this.	The	ulterior	motive	of	the	IBAHRI	 program	 was	 to	 install	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association	 in	 Myanmar.102	 ILAM,	 however,	 offers	 only	 an	incomplete	 step	 towards	 this	 goal.	 ILAM	 is	 an	 organization	 for	Myanmar’s	 lawyers	 operating	 outside	 state	 control,	 but	 the	possibility	of	an	independent	national	bar	association	that	is	fully	capable	of	regulating	the	legal	profession	continues	to	be	limited	by	 the	Myanmar	Bar	Council	Act	of	1929	and	 its	Amendment	of	
                                                             98.	 Crouch,	supra	note	21,	at	28.		99.	 IBA	2015b,	supra	note	1.	100.	 IBA	International	Principles	on	Conduct,	supra	note	56.	101.	 Bar	Council	Act	1929,	supra	note	26.	102.	 Bar	Council	Act	Amendment	1989,	supra	note	30.	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1155	1989.103	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 achievement	 of	 IBA	 ideals	 in	Myanmar	requires	a	change	in	Myanmar	law	that	amends	or	supersedes	the	status	quo.	The	lack	of	such	change	suggests	that	the	development	of	 ILAM	 falls	 short	 of	 Teubner’s	 expectation	 for	 legal	transformation.	As	 much	 as	 ILAM	 may	 fall	 short	 with	 respect	 to	 legal	transformation,	however,	it	arguably	does	represent	a	measure	of	social	 transformation.	 The	 IBAHRI	 program	 occurred	 within	 a	social	 space	 constituted	 by	 the	 Myanmar	 government,	 bar	associations,	 and	 lawyer	 organizations	 and	 IBA	 associates.104	 In	driving	its	agenda,	the	IBAHRI	program	influenced	the	actors	in	the	social	space	by	advancing	the	idea	of	an	independent	national	bar	association.105	The	idea	existed	in	Myanmar	prior	to	the	instigation	of	the	IBAHRI,	but	the	program	served	as	a	catalyst	that	assembled	the	 disparate	 actors	 and	 focused	 their	 efforts	 on	 a	 common	process.106	As	a	 result,	 it	 changed	 the	 social	 system	of	Myanmar	legal	 actors	 by	 coalescing	 their	 efforts	 into	 a	 collective	 activity,	such	 that	 there	was	engagement	between	Myanmar	 legal	actors,	the	Myanmar	state,	and	foreign	experts.107	Such	engagement	was	constructive,	as	it	led	to	a	native	Myanmar	agenda	that	altered	the	formation	 of	 ILAM	 away	 from	 IBA	 preferences.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	creation	 of	 ILAM	 reflected	 Teubner’s	 conception	 of	 a	 social	transformation	wherein	an	idea	such	as	an	independent	national	bar	association	spurs	changes	in	a	social	system	even	as	the	idea	is	changed	by	that	system.	The	 disparity	 in	 the	 development	 of	 ILAM	 between	 the	components	 of	 legal	 transformation	 and	 social	 transformation	serves	to	qualify	Teubner’s	conception	of	legal	transplants,	in	that	it	indicates	the	co-evolutionary	dynamic	posed	by	Teubner	is	not	necessarily	 equal	 between	 legal	 and	 social	 changes.	 Rather,	 the	case	of	ILAM	demonstrates	a	legal	transplant	that	so	far	has	been	led	by	a	social	transformation	for	the	goal	of	producing	an	eventual	legal	 transformation.	The	experiences	of	 the	 IBAHRI	program	 in	the	creation	of	ILAM	suggest	that	a	legal	irritant	may	cause	legal	and	 social	 transformation,	 but	 that	 the	 two	 processes	 are	 not	
                                                             103.	 Id.	104.	 IBA	2015b,	supra	note	1.	105.	 IBA	2014f,	supra	note	36.	106.	 Cheesman	&	Min	San,	supra	note	50.	107.	 Interviews	ILAM	2015;	Interviews	ILAM	2016.	
1156	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	necessarily	proportional,	such	that	change	can	be	skewed	towards	one	over	 the	other.	 Teubner’s	 notion	of	 a	 legal	 irritant,	 in	 other	words,	 is	 not	 purely	 represented	 by	 cases	 involving	 concurrent	legal	and	social	components	but	can	encompass	scenarios	where	irritation	is	driven	by	an	unequal	balance	between	the	two.	
V.	CONCLUSION	AND	FUTURE	DIRECTIONS	The	 preceding	 sections	 used	 the	 IBAHRI’s	work	 to	 develop	ILAM	 as	 a	 case	 exemplifying	 an	 attempted	 legal	 transplant	 of	international	 expectations	 for	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	association	 into	a	domestic	Myanmar	context.	The	analysis	used	the	events	associated	with	the	formation	of	ILAM	to	draw	insights	regarding	 nuances	 in	 Teubner’s	 notion	 of	 legal	 irritants.	 As	 a	process	separate	from	state	authority	promoting	a	legal	institution	outside	of	state	control,	the	IBAHRI’s	work	on	ILAM	represents	an	attempted	legal	transplant	via	non-state	processes.	The	nature	of	ILAM’s	 experiences,	 however,	 highlight	 contextual	 factors	 in	Myanmar	 that	 indicate	 a	 basis	 for	 several	 interventions	 in	Teubner’s	conception	of	legal	transplant	theory:	(1)	Teubner’s	idea	of	 legal	 irritants	 driving	 an	 evolutionary	 dynamic	 fostering	reconstruction	of	an	external	legal	concept	and	transformation	of	an	 internal	 context	 is	not	 something	 that	necessarily	 culminates	with	 definable	 change,	 but	 can	 instead	 in	 cases	 like	 ILAM	continue—potentially	in	perpetuity—without	a	clearly	identifiable	end	 and	with	 uncertain	manifestations	 of	 change;	 (2)	Teubner’s	sense	of	an	evolutionary	dynamic	can	exhibit	character	in	terms	of	the	 levels	 of	 contention	 associated	 with	 reconstruction	 of	 an	external	 idea	 and	 transformation	 of	 local	 context,	 with	 the	development	of	ILAM	demonstrating	how	divergent	views	among	foreign	 and	 local	 actors	 drove	 the	 tensions	 associated	 with	 the	IBAHRI’s	work	behind	ILAM;	and	(3)	Teubner’s	perspective	of	legal	irritants	 encompassing	 both	 legal	 and	 social	 change	 does	 not	necessarily	 entail	 an	 equal	 measure	 of	 both,	 since	 ILAM’s	experiences	 demonstrate	 a	 case	 more	 reflective	 of	 social	transformation	and	less	reflective	of	legal	transformation,	with	the	latter	being	left	as	a	potential	future	prospect.	Beyond	 theory,	 the	 case	of	 ILAM	proffers	 insights	 for	other	situations	 involving	 attempts	 to	 transplant	 legal	 ideas	 from	 an	international	 level	 to	 local	contexts.	To	begin,	 the	experiences	of	ILAM	 indicate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 local	 factors	 within	 a	 given	
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1157	context	 can	 affect	 the	 work	 of	 foreign	 actors	 to	 promote	international	ideals.	In	particular,	as	much	as	the	IBAHRI	sought	to	create	an	independent	national	bar	association	consistent	with	IBA	expectations	such	as	decentralized	authority,	collective	decision-making,	 direct	 elections	 of	 executives,	 and	 leadership	opportunities	 for	 women	 and	 youth,	 the	 Myanmar	 participants	working	 within	 the	 IBAHRI	 activities	 for	 ILAM	 produced	 an	organization	 favoring	 centralized	 authority,	 leadership	 tied	 to	seniority	 and	 experience,	 and	 a	 postponement	 in	 diversity	initiatives.	Such	a	divergence	shows	how	 local	actors,	 even	ones	that	share	with	foreign	entities	ideas	for	legal	institutions	like	an	independent	 national	 bar	 association,	 can	 exert	 themselves	 in	ways	 that	 alter	 the	 efforts	 of	 international	 aid	 away	 from	 their	original	 aspirations.	As	 demonstrated	by	 the	 case	 of	 ILAM,	 local	actors	possess	their	own	interests	and	perspectives	and	have	the	ability	 to	 exercise	 them—even	 when	 working	 in	 concert	 with	foreign	 voices	 in	 mechanisms	 like	 the	 IBAHRI—in	 ways	 that	generate	outcomes	that	differ	from	international	ideals.	In	 addition,	 the	 experience	 of	 ILAM	 indicates	 the	 need	 for	greater	scope	in	pursuing	a	legal	transplant	of	international	ideas	into	a	local	context.	ILAM	resulted	from	IBAHRI	efforts	to	create	an	independent	 national	 bar	 association,	 but	 the	 manifestation	 of	ILAM	as	an	organization	was	not	by	itself	sufficient	to	establish	IBA	aspirations	 for	 an	 independent	 national	 bar	 association	 in	Myanmar.	The	 shortfall	was	not	due	entirely	 to	 the	dynamics	of	foreign	and	local	actors	involved	in	the	formation	of	ILAM:	during	the	 time	 of	 the	 IBAHRI	 initiative	 for	 ILAM	 Myanmar’s	 political	environment	 accommodated	 the	 creation	 and	 existence	 of	organizations	 like	 ILAM,	 but	 the	body	of	Myanmar	 laws	host	 an	environment	that	adheres	to	historical	restrictions	on	the	idea	of	an	 independent	national	 bar	 association.	 The	Bar	Council	Act	 of	1929	 and	 the	 Bar	 Council	 Act	 Amendment	 of	 1989	 collectively	maintain	 centralized	 control	 over	Myanmar’s	 lawyers	 under	 the	Attorney	 General’s	 Office	 and	 Supreme	 Court.	 As	 a	 result,	while	ILAM	may	be	a	national	association	for	lawyers	independent	of	the	Myanmar	state,	it	does	not	have	the	power	of	bar	associations	in	other	 countries	 to	 regulate	 the	 legal	 profession,	 and	 so	 leaves	Myanmar’s	 lawyers	 subject	 to	 the	 continuing	 authority	 of	 the	Myanmar	 state.	 Aspirations	 to	 allow	 greater	 independence	 for	Myanmar	 lawyers	outside	 state	 control	 calls	 for	attention	 to	 the	
1158	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	legal	constraints	on	the	legal	profession.	Such	a	call	implies	that	the	work	to	create	ILAM	was	only	part	of	a	need	for	broader	reforms	of	Myanmar’s	legal	system	as	a	whole	and	that	efforts	to	promote	ideas	like	ILAM	need	to	be	seen	as	an	element	of	a	larger	suite	of	strategies	 to	 foster	 change.	 Specifically,	 the	 case	 of	 ILAM	 shows	that	the	transplantation	of	a	legal	idea	requires	more	than	just	the	installation	of	a	legal	institution	but	rather	a	concert	of	activities	encompassing	 a	 holistic	 overview	 of	 coordinated	 reforms	 that	bring	 systemic	 change	 sufficient	 to	 allow	 the	 growth	 and	realization	of	the	transplanted	idea.	The	topic	of	 large-scale	change	to	support	the	promotion	of	international	 ideals	 points	 to	 directions	 for	 further	 research.	 In	particular,	 sociology	 literature	 provides	 a	 body	 of	 scholarship	addressing	 transnational	 means	 of	 large-scale	 change,	 with	potential	 areas	 of	 research	 on	 transnational	 social	 movements,	transnational	 advocacy	 networks,	 and	 cross-border	intermediaries	that	detail	how	international	ideas	are	propagated	into	local	contexts.108	Hence,	it	would	be	worthwhile	to	explore	the	potential	for	the	literature	in	these	areas	to	offer	potential	insights	for	the	field	of	legal	transplants,	particularly	with	respect	to	non-state	legal	transplants.	Another	potential	direction	for	further	studies	is	with	respect	to	historical	analysis.	The	IBAHRI’s	efforts	to	create	ILAM	was	part	of	an	effort	to	reform	the	status	quo	of	Myanmar	laws	regarding	the	legal	profession.	The	Myanmar	status	quo,	however,	is	a	result	of	reforms	to	laws	that	existed	under	British	colonial	rule,	which	in	turn	were	a	reform	of	a	pre-colonial	legal	system	predating	British	Burma.	 Such	 a	 series	 points	 to	 a	 succession	 of	 legal	 transplants	over	 time	 that	 raise	 the	 question	 as	 to	 the	 relationships	 and	legacies	left	by	prior	legal	systems	upon	later	ones.	Following	from	Teubner’s	 conceptions	 of	 legal	 transplants	 both	 changing	 and	being	 changed	 by	 local	 contexts,	 each	 legal	 system	 in	 history	influences	society	and	thereby	alters	the	context	facing	later	legal	
                                                             108.	 See	 generally	 TRANSNATIONAL	 PROTEST	 AND	 GLOBAL	 ACTIVISM	 (Donatella	 Della	Porta	&	 Sidney	Tarrow	 eds.)	 (2005);	 SIDNEY	TARROW,	THE	NEW	TRANSACTIONAL	ACTIVISM	(2005);	SANJEEV	KHAGRAM,	JAMES	RIKER	&	KATHRYN	SIKKINK,	RESTRUCTURING	WORLD	POLITICS:	TRANSNATIONAL	SOCIAL	MOVEMENTS,	NETWORKS,	AND	NORMS	(2002);	YVES	DEZALAY	&	BRYANT	GARTH,	THE	IMPORT	AND	EXPORT	OF	LAW	AND	LEGAL	INSTITUTIONS:	INTERNATIONAL	STRATEGIES	IN	NATIONAL	PALACE	WARS,	 IN	ADAPTING	LEGAL	CULTURES	 (David	Nelken	&	 Johannes	 Feest	eds.,	2001);	MARGARET	KECK	&	KATHRYN	SIKKINK,	ACTIVISTS	BEYOND	BORDERS	(1998).			
2020]	 INDEPENDENT	LAWYERS’	ASSOCIATION	 1159	transplants.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 study	of	 legal	 transplants	would	be	enriched	 by	 greater	 consideration	 of	 the	 longitudinal	 path	 of	 a	country’s	legal	history	and	unpacking	of	the	connections	between	different	stages	in	the	progression	of	legal	systems	encompassed	by	that	history.																																				
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